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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     KATHRYN HYLAND, et al.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
                                              New York, N.Y.
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                                              18 Civ. 9031 (DLC)
                 v.
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     NAVIENT CORPORATION, et al.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                               Teleconference
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                                               Fairness Hearing
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                                               October 2, 2020
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                                               3:10 p.m.
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     Before:
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                            HON. DENISE L. COTE,
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                                               District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      SELENDY & GAY, PLLC
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
     BY: FAITH E. GAY
19
          YELENA KONANOVA
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     PHILLIPS RICHARD & RIND, P.A.
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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     BY: MARK RICHARD
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           ASHLEY M. SIMONSEN
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                                 APPEARANCES
                                 (continued)
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      LAW OFFICE OF ERIC ALAN ISAACSON
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10
      NEDRA BARNES-LARRIEUX
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      DR. JANE HANSON
           Pro Se Objector
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      MICHAEL LOMBARDO
           Pro Se Objector
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      GREGORY CLAUSS
           Pro Se Objector
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is Judge Cote.

Do we have a court reporter?

THE COURT REPORTER: Good afternoon, Judge. Kristen Carannante.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I will briefly take appearances for the plaintiff.

MS. KONANOVA: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is
Yelena Konanova of Selendy & Gay for the plaintiffs. I'm here
with Faith Gay of Selendy & Gay, and our co-counsel, Mark
Richard, is also on the line.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And for the defendants.

MS. SIMONSEN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Ashley Simonsen, of Covington & Burling, for the defendants Navient Corporation and Navient Solutions, and also on the line with me today is my colleague Andrew Ruffino, also of Covington & Burling.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And counsel for the objector Richard Carson.

MR. ISAACSON: Good afternoon, your Honor.

May it please the Court:

I'm Eric Alan Isaacson, representing Richard E.

Carson III, a class member and objector.

THE COURT: And counsel for objector William Yeatman.

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line.

1 MS. ST. JOHN: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is 2 Anna St. John, with the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute on 3 behalf of objector William Yeatman. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 And I believe we have five other objectors. 6 Ms. Amoroso, are you on the line? 7 MS. AMOROSO: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor. This 8 is Jessica Amoroso. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 And is it Ms. Nedra Barnes-Larrieux? Ms. Barnes-Larrieux, are you on the line? 11 12 MS. BARNES-LARRIEUX: Good afternoon. 13 Ms. Barnes-Larrieux is on the line. My apologies. I was 14 muted. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 Jane Hanson, are you on the line? 17 DR. HANSON: Yes. Good afternoon, Judge. I am here. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. 19 Michael Lombardo, are you on the line? 20 MR. LOMBARDO: I am here, your Honor. Good afternoon. 21 Thank you.

MR. CLAUSS: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is Gregory Clauss.

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THE COURT: And finally Gregory Clauss, are you on the

THE COURT: Good.

So normally, counsel, we would all be meeting in my -counsel and objectors, we would all be meeting in my courtroom
for this fairness hearing, but as everyone is well aware, we
are in the middle of a pandemic, and therefore we are
conducting this fairness hearing through a telephone conference
call with each other.

I have given public notice of this fairness hearing, and therefore members of the press or the public or other objectors to whom I have not given permission to speak may also and I hope are listening in.

Let me welcome everyone and begin with a brief introduction of what's going to happen at this fairness hearing.

On April 24 of this year, the parties in this litigation entered into a settlement agreement. In that settlement agreement, the defendants, who I will refer to as "Navient," agreed to pay \$2,400,000. All of it is destined for a cy-près fund, if it is not reduced by the Court to pay either incentive awards or make an award of attorney's fees. That cy-près fund has now been identified by the plaintiffs as the Public Service Promise organization.

The parties, in their settlement agreement, agreed that a cy-près award of \$1,750,000 was appropriate and that incentive awards of \$15,000 a piece for each class

representative were appropriate, and Navient agreed not to object to an application of reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of half a million dollars. In that settlement agreement, Navient also agreed to enact what are described as enhancements to its business practices.

The parties agreed that the settlement would be final despite any order reducing or relating to the application in connection with attorney's fees or incentive awards.

Therefore, it is understood that Navient will be paying \$2,400,000 in total -- no more, no less. Navient also agreed to pay the cost of providing notice to the class and for administration of the settlement.

All class members have reserved or retained their right to sue Navient for damages due to them as individual plaintiffs should they bring such lawsuits. The class representatives, though, have waived the right to sue Navient in the future, and it is understood that this settlement will bar any further class action litigation arising out of the same allegation or related allegation.

Let me make a few initial observations about this settlement:

As I mentioned, this action was brought as a class action. There was a motion to dismiss brought against the litigation as described in the complaint, that is, against the claims described in the complaint, and only one claim survived

that motion to dismiss litigation. It was a New York State law claim. And as the parties' papers recognize, or at least the plaintiffs' papers recognize, this case, in the court's view, was unlikely to succeed as a class action if litigation proceeded further. Any misrepresentations that may have been made by Navient or any omissions, failures to speak, would have arisen in response to questions asked by borrowers, and that analysis, both questions and the responses, were all dependent on the circumstances described by the borrowers and as those circumstances were understood by Navient. That presented an enormous hurdle to finding that there were common questions of fact that would bind the class and for finding that individual fact issues and questions would not overwhelm this litigation if pursued as a class action.

During the course of this litigation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a
decision in a lawsuit called Berni. That decision was issued
on July 8 of this year, and I asked both the plaintiffs and
defense counsel to respond in letters about the implications of
Berni for approval of their settlement agreement, and they did
so in letters of July 20, and the plaintiffs' letter of July
20, I think, captures the challenges of pursuing this
litigation as a class action. The plaintiffs' counsel
explained that borrowers allege harm from misrepresentations
regarding complex and individualized financial issues, not a

simple, repetitive deception easily understood upon purchase and visual inspection of a product. Therefore, what appeared to be true early in this case was that this litigation was unlikely to be certified as a class action, and unless it were certified as a class action to recover damages, there can be no recovery of damages for the class upon successful pursuit of the litigation.

The settlement here and my role today does not require me to find whatsoever that Navient's past business practices were inadequate in any way. That is not my role today, and I am not equipped, based on what I know as of now, to make a finding in that regard.

But that being said, I want to congratulate the parties on their settlement. I think they are to be praised for this creative resolution of these issues. Public service employees deserve our nation's thanks at all times. During this pandemic I think we are particularly aware of the great debt our nation owes them, and to the extent that settlement will benefit public service employees, it is all to the good. And to the extent that this settlement benefits Navient by causing it to improve its practices and training, that is all to the good as well. Any corporate citizen in this country should want to hold itself to the highest ethical standards and a settlement that insists and encourages that is to be valued.

So what we are going to do now is hear from the

objectors to this settlement. Notice was given after I approved the notice process and the wording of the notice, so the objectors have been given a description of this litigation and an opportunity to make their objections in writing and by speaking. In order to make an additional objection orally, they were required to comply with the requirements set out in the notice; and, while 21 class members requested to be heard orally at this hearing, only seven have complied with the requirements set out in the notice.

So I issued an order this week, on September 30, listing those seven individuals and the time that they would be permitted to speak. I have listed them in alphabetical order of the objectors' names, except for one objector. Mr. Clauss only sought one minute, and I thank Mr. Clauss for his willingness to be concise in comments. Since the others are being held to five minutes, I let Mr. Clauss be the last to speak so he would have the benefit of anything that was said before.

After we have heard from the objectors, I will hear from plaintiffs' counsel and I will hear from defendants' counsel, and then I will give you my ruling first on the settlement generally, then on the request for incentive awards, and finally on the request for an attorney's fee award.

In connection with that last request, I want to put everyone on notice of the following: I have a concern as to

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whether this Court and the class were given adequate notice of the attorney's fees request being made and presented to me today.

And so with that initial observation, Ms. Amoroso, you have five minutes to convey anything you would like to convey to me regarding this settlement.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Ms. Amoroso?

MS. AMOROSO: Yes. This is Jessica Amoroso. Good afternoon, your Honor.

May it please the Court:

Thank you for hearing our statements today.

I respectfully ask this Court to refrain from approving the proposed public student loan forgiveness settlement regarding Navient in this matter.

My objection lies upon three main pillars:

First, the vast --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Ms. Amoroso?

MS. AMOROSO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. We have a court reporter. So, it is important that she capture everything you say, and so please, if you could, slow down. Thank you.

MS. AMOROSO: Yes, your Honor. I apologize.

The three main pillars that I support my objection with are the vastness of the scope of the eligible class

members, the fact that the settlement does not provide any financial compensation to all of the class members, and that the proposed relief isn't sufficient to remedy the systemic problems presented and exacerbated by Navient's loan servicing practices at the expense of PSLF borrowers.

The scope of the class in this matter is far reaching and affects hundreds of thousands of student loan borrowers across this country. A matter of this magnitude requires thorough vetting to reach and inform class members of the rights that they will forego in this settlement.

This includes current borrowers, those who have submitted a PSLF application who have been rejected, those who will enter repayment at a future time, and those who have missed the opportunity to accumulate qualifying payments and have lost those opportunities while serving forbearance periods.

There is a vast application to many professions who are similarly situated, share commonality, and have been collectively affected by Navient's loan servicing practices in the PSLF program.

Navient's Legal Action Facts website indicates that there are more than 400,000 borrowers serviced by Navient paying off their student loans every year. In a Department of Education report issued last month, there were over 3 million eligible employment certification forms. The Department of

Education last year rejected over 100,000 PSLF applications, and the Federal Student Aid Data Center indicated that 24 percent rejected those who were missing information on forgiveness applications and 15 percent for ineligible loans. These issues, if properly maintained through the loan servicing business, could have been identified just by the mere fact of servicing loans through the PSLF process.

The settlement, once entered, carries long-ranging ramifications for generations of student loan borrowers who may not have been notified and therefore will unknowingly forego rights to pursue class actions against Navient in the future.

The proposed settlement also does not afford any monetary relief for all class members. At the outset, there is a glaring inequity presented in the PSA regarding the financial relief, but it is — because there is \$500,000 being afforded to plaintiffs' attorneys and none of the class members will see any financial compensation. Additionally, this amount is more than 30 times that of which each class representative has sought to receive under the settlement.

In addressing the third main reason why I propose an objection in this matter is the fact that altogether those business practice proposal modifications are ultimately reactive to the sum, that do not address past harms, namely, those by PSLF borrowers who missed the opportunity to accumulate qualifying payments, and therefore financial

compensation would be the best remedy to rectify that harm.

Additionally, as an example, Navient proposes that they will create forms to be sent electronically via e-mail to borrowers to request additional information about PSLF. This is a systemic omission of critical tailored forms that should have been available in the first place, so instituting this resolution does not adequately compensate the class in this matter.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Amoroso. I appreciate that.

MS. AMOROSO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

And is it Ms. Barnes-Larrieux?

MS. BARNES-LARRIEUX: Yes. That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MS. BARNES-LARRIEUX: Thank you.

Good afternoon, Judge. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak today.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to successfully obtain an undergraduate and postgraduate degrees, which I believe have created consistent career progression in my current field.

I have held loans with Navient for an estimated 15 years or more that are all in good standing. During that time, I have inquired about the Public Service Loan Forgiveness

process, as I have been a public servant since 2003 based on the criteria outlined by the Federal Student Aid website.

I have contacted Navient on a number of occasions, sometimes three to four times a year, to get clarity on the process. Because the information provided by Navient has not been consistent as of today, I have yet to complete the Public Service Loan Forgiveness application, yet I have continued to make consistent payments that are all in good standing. Because of the unclear guidance, it has been less than motivating and very discouraging to complete this process.

Also, I have been informed by some Navient representatives that I do qualify for Public Service Loan Forgiveness. Other Navient representatives have informed me that I do not, as recent as January of this year.

Additionally, I have been met with less than satisfactory customer service and continued unclear responses regarding why I do not qualify for this process. I have had errors made on my account when applying for income-driven repayment loan plans. I have also had my husband's income challenged when he transitioned from active to reserve duty status in the military.

Again, I contacted Navient on or about July of this year to request a transcript of my communications with Navient from the last ten years. At that time, I was informed I could request this information and the transcript would be mailed to

me. However, I was not informed during that call if there were any additional steps required of me as the loan holder. I never received the transcript from Navient or any communications regarding why the requests could not be completed. Yet again, another misrepresentation of Navient's communication with me.

For the aforementioned reasons, I believe Navient should uphold higher standards and take accountability for misrepresentation of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness process communicated to me as well as other loan holders.

The Navient mission statement reads: "At Navient, our mission is to enhance the financial success of our customers by delivering innovative solutions and insights with compassion and personalized service." Navient has not upheld this mission to me or many others who have been affected or impacted by the lack of clear communication with respect to Public Service Loan Forgiveness. It is important to understand that as long as I have an outstanding debt with Navient or any other loan holder and accumulate interest, it does not benefit me, but Navient.

Thank you for allowing me to speak, and I hope that what I have said is taken into consideration.

THE COURT: Well, it certainly will be, and thank you. And, really, I have great appreciation for every objector and everyone who has asked to be heard either through their written submission or orally. It is very significant.

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MR. ISAACSON: Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the Court:

Mr. Carson.

This is Eric Alan Isaacson for Richard E. Carson III.

Several matters I would like to focus on:

One is the fact that the settlement agreement bans individual members of the class from proceeding with a class action. Well, actually, what the settlement agreement says is to define a class action or aggregate action as "any litigation proceeding in which five or more separate individuals propose to prosecute their claims in the context of the same legal proceeding." So we are not talking about a settlement agreement that merely bars class actions where it might be difficult to certify a class on account of individual issues relating to reliance. This is barring any aggregate litigation where five or more members of the class who may have very similar claims try to proceed in a single action. That is prohibited. So this does not just ban class action, it bars mass actions. And, quite frankly, that means that you wouldn't be able to put together 100 or 1,000 class members in order to proceed to trial with a mass action. It's going to have to be individual claims, no more than four.

That makes individual litigation impossible as an economic matter. It is not economically feasible. So as a practical matter, this is barring the litigation of most

individual class members' claims. They cannot do it. That means, as a practical matter, they should be treated as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, with people given an opportunity to opt out so they can defend their real interest in this stuff. The fact that Navient has insisted on including such a provision is, I think, a very strong indication that members of the class are losing something very important when they are barred from proceeding with individual actions.

Another point that I think bears some emphasis is the fact that there is a conflict of interest with respect to AFT organizing the litigation, instigating the litigation, choosing the named plaintiffs who are its members, and then hiring and paying class counsel. That is a conflict of interest to which class members have not consented.

I think that it is necessary for the Court to consider and for the class to be able to see a number of things. That would include the plaintiffs' retainer agreements with class counsel. It would also include all communications between AFT and class counsel and all communications between AFT and the named plaintiffs. Because AFT is not a party and because AFT is not a law firm, that does not violate attorney-client privilege to require production of those things. They should be made a part of the court record in this case because of the inherent problems of conflict of interest.

Those problems are exacerbated by the fact that the

named plaintiffs are getting \$15,000 a piece which compromise individual class members, the rest of the class's ability to pursue litigation in a settlement agreement that bars five people from getting together to litigate their claims, making that litigation impossible.

Those incentive awards are illegal under the Supreme Court's opinion in *Greenough*, *Trustees* v. *Greenough*, and *Pettit*. They are also illegal under New York law. They are prohibited by the principles that in Rule 23 class actions class members are not supposed to get extra benefits that members of the class do not get. It's a grossly unfair settlement arrangement and cannot be accepted.

I also have to object to the September 25 declaration that class counsel put in asserting that, with respect to the individual named plaintiffs, six of them, six of ten have loans that are still serviced by Navient. If you look at the declarations they put in, it looks like only two of ten. If class counsel is going to rely on communications from class representatives from the named plaintiffs, they need to be made a part of the record. By trying to rely on them, any attorney-client privilege has been waived. And if they do not put those communications in, I don't think that class counsel's hearsay declaration can be relied on, and we move to strike it.

The same goes with respect to what the declaration

says about a communication from Navient about the number of members of the class who received notice who are participants in FedLoans, and moved to FedLoan. We need to see the communication from Navient. We need to know what the communication from Navient was based on. And I want to emphasize that it does not say Navient communicated that most members of the class still have loans serviced by Navient. I think that that is telling. Most members of the class do not have loans serviced by Navient. That means that the injunctive relief is prohibited by the Second Circuit in Berni opinion, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes the Supreme Court's opinion.

And with respect to the *cy-près* award, it is clearly designed to help future people, future students taking out loans, not the current class. It is something that cannot be approved for that reason, and the indication in the papers that we have seen is that it is only going to serve 11,000 people a year. This is a class that consists of over 300,000 people, your Honor.

Under the circumstances, the proposed settlement cannot be approved.

I see my five minutes have run. It really has not been enough time to underscore all of the problems with this settlement.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carson, but of course -- MR. ISAACSON: Mr. Isaacson.

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               THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Isaacson. You made a
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      written submission as well and that certainly --
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               MR. ISAACSON: Yes.
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               THE COURT: -- is part of the record. Thank you
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      very --
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               MR. ISAACSON: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: -- very much for your comments.
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               Ms. Hanson.
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               MR. ISAACSON: Your Honor, I made a written
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      submission, but I did not have the benefit of the September
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      11th communication from class counsel regarding the
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      relationship with AFT. I did not get to see the declaration
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      that was put in on the 25th. There are a lot of things that I
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      have not had the opportunity to review before putting in the
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      written declaration -- written objection and memorandum.
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               Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Isaacson.
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               Ms. Hanson.
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               DR. HANSON: Good afternoon, and thank you, your
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      Honor.
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               May it please the Court:
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               I am Dr. Jane Hanson, and I hope to add some more
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     personal insights about the people who are harmed by dropping
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the class action suit. I would -- I opine that the purpose of

these forgiveness programs for student loans is to encourage

institutions communities. We have heard that. My own public service and use of my doctorate has been highly unorthodox. Instead of selecting from my tenure-track faculty offers, I chose to return to my alma mater to be close to my home, my family, my roots, and to give back to the people of my state, Nebraska.

While consolidating my full-time position as advisor and senior lecturer at UNL, which has been my primary employment for the past 11 plus years, I also served as a half-time director of the Family Literacy Program for our local Lincoln Literacy Council. Lincoln's public school system Boasts over 76 languages because we have been a center for immigrant resettlement for the past 20 years. This translates to a very great appreciation of English as a second language and increasing literacy skills.

Early childhood teachers here, as everywhere, are responsible for referrals for special ed. Our youngest immigrants, those also targeted by the nonprofit Family Literacy project, were at risk of deferral when teachers had little experience differentiating between ESL or language delays. I involved young teachers from the university's teacher education program and novel pre-practicum teaching experiences. And as a final illustration of my unorthodoxy, of being an outlier, an uber social contributor, I received the

prestigious President's Lifetime Volunteer Service Award in 2019 for more than 7,000 hours as a Mensa Education and Research Foundation Trustee.

I am a communications specialist, having taught language and social linguistics for 22 plus years, from pre-K to adult learning. I recognize good communication, and I am now the victim of very poor communication.

Financial entities need to be experts at communication. However, Navient has been woefully remiss in communication as follows:

- 1. I consolidated my student loans upon graduation in 2008 and no one, not even my previous university, told me that consolidating different types of loans together might jeopardize forbearance of the loan or even that I could choose to consolidate either with a private entity or a government entity. The purposes for different types of loans were never explained, neither by Direct Loan Servicing nor the university, nor were the ramifications of the choice of private over governmental entity. At some point I was informed that Navient would be taking charge of my consolidated loan. There was no explanation at that time the significance, nor was there any choice or recourse offered. I signed.
- 2. I strongly object to the proposed settlement because although it addresses a piece of the corporation's communication woes, as we have just seen, it discards with a

broad brush all those who have in good faith maintained their commitment and provides them with no financial relief.

Furthermore, I was informed in 2009, in a telephone conversation, following up on my loan consolidation with the agent at Navient, that my loan would be eligible for forgiveness if I worked for my new employer, University of Nebraska, a public entity, for at least ten years. I made sure I never missed a payment or was late, although I struggled financially and with both my sons disabled, I maintained my unorthodox status by never doing so. I have never missed a payment nor have I been late.

- 3. However, in May of 2017, nine years later, when I first submitted my Public Loan -- Public Service Loan Forgiveness form, Navient informed me that only one of my loans -- I had supplied copies of the first and of second document, as well -- precluded me from qualifying for the PSLF for a mere \$5,000 out of a total of all of my loans. This pretext was used to bar me from forgiveness. I have not missed one payment or been late, again.
- 4. At age 66, I have to be one of the oldest members of this class action as I finished my doctorate in 2008 at the age of 54.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Dr. Hanson, I am losing you. Can you speak up?

DR. HANSON: Yes, I can.

THE COURT: Thank you.

DR. HANSON: At age 66, I have -- you're welcome.

At age 66, I have to be one of the oldest members of the class action, as I finished my doctorate in 2008 at the age of 54. Navient has not informed me that there is any decrease in payment available for income reduction, such as in my retirement, or at any time previously, in any of my communication with Navient. Furthermore, I only learned of this possibility by reading the materials related to this class action suit and materials published in the press.

Thank you for reflecting on my words. Those of us speaking here today have been victimized by the corporate actions of Navient. There has to be a -- I'm sorry. Is that --

THE COURT: Dr. Hanson, I very much appreciate your words. I think you are reacting to some ambient noise here, but I --

DR. HANSON: I managed to get rid of it. It was mine. I have two sentences, and then I am done. Thank you.

So I say thank you for reflecting on my words, and I just said those of us speaking here today have been victimized by the corporate actions of Navient. There has been harm done. Their statement says that they show compassion. Please tell them to respect the students who have made a commitment to be contributors and good citizens by making their payments.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Lombardo.

MR. LOMBARDO: Thank you, your Honor, and good afternoon.

So, to start out, in 2007, I had private loans with Sallie Mae. I was employed at the time as an in-home family therapist for a human social services organization here in Pittsburgh, working with troubled children and their families involved with Allegheny County Juvenile Family Court. Since November 2007, I have been at my current position as a juvenile probation officer for Allegheny County Juvenile Probation.

Because of my employment, I heard bits and pieces about Public Service Loan Forgiveness in 2008-2009, and in either April or May 2009, I called Sallie Mae --

THE COURT: Mr. Lombardo, Officer Lombardo, if you could just slow down, please.

MR. LOMBARDO: I will, your Honor. Thank you.

So 2008-2009, I called Sallie Mae customer service, in either April or May of that year, to see if I qualified for Public Service Loan Forgiveness. I wanted to find out more. I told them what I did for a living. I was told that I was eligible for this, even though I had private loans, and I was never told that I had to switch to direct federal loans. I believed the customer service representative, and I kept making

my payments.

Then in May 2012, because I made a few extra payments, I wanted to skip a payment and go on vacation and use that money for my vacation. I called Sallie Mae to see if I could do that and still be on track. That's when I was told I was not eligible for Public Service Loan Forgiveness because I had private loans, which is not what I was told three years earlier. I continued making my monthly payments, but to say I was angry, understatement.

I started taking action in 2013. I wrote Sallie Mae, told them what happened, and I merely wanted these previous payments to be retroactively applied as part of the 120 payments, so come October 2017, I could get loan forgiveness. All they did, all Sallie Mae did was write me and tell me that we value you as a customer and told me to switch to Direct Federal Loans. They never addressed my concerns and totally ignored me.

In 2014-2015, besides writing to Sallie Mae Chairman Anthony Terraciano at the time, I wrote the Department of Education and my three elected officials in Washington -- Representative Mike Doyle, Senator Toomey, and Senator Casey -- asking them to help me out, so come October 2017 I could get forgiveness. I never heard from the education department. My three elected officials all wrote me back and told me essentially that there is nothing they could do for me. I will

highlight, in Navient's transparency report 2018, it said that Senators Toomey and Casey received campaign contributions from Navient.

In 2014, I switched to Direct Federal Loans. I learned that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and my Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro filed lawsuits against Navient, I believe both in 2017. I filed complaints with both entities, and I am awaiting the outcome of those lawsuits. The Navient consumer advocate told the Attorney General's office that they have no record of me calling them in 2009, but yet they have record of me calling them in 2012 when they told me I was not eligible.

From October 2017 to this past June 2020, I made 43 more payments, paying a grand total of \$42,777.41, until my loan got paid off. Now, had Navient and Sallie Mae told me the right information from the get-go, I would not have had to pay an additional close to \$43,000 since October 2007.

So I object because I figure if they have the money to make political contributions and to spend money to improve the system with Public Service Loan Forgiveness, which they should have done in the first place, then certainly they should have the money to refund every one of us after our 120th payment if we should have gotten loan forgiveness but didn't, like in my case the \$42,777.41. And so I feel as though they should first use that money that they want to use to improve the system and

refund it to us first.

And then for those ten plaintiffs there that they are supposed to be getting \$15,000, let's say one of them paid \$45,000 after the 120th payment when they should not have. If they are only getting 15,000 and not 45,000, they are getting short-changed \$30,000 and, frankly, I really don't think that's fair.

So for those reasons, I have to object to the settlement.

And thank you, your Honor, for giving me this opportunity to finally speak about this in federal court, as I have been fighting this battle for over seven years now.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lombardo. Very appreciated.

So the objector, Mr. Yeatman, I believe, is represented by counsel, Ms. St. John.

MS. ST. JOHN: Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the Court:

Anna St. John representing objector William Yeatman.

I plan to use my time today to address some of plaintiffs' response to Mr. Yeatman's objection.

First, there is a mismatch here, your Honor, that prevents certification under 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on behalf of a class defined as those who

intended to contact Navient in the future, and they sought monetary relief on behalf of class defined retrospectively as those who contacted Navient in the past.

Yet now the settlement takes that retrospectively defined class, settles claims for which damages are appropriate, gives the class only forward-looking injunctive relief, and waives their right to participate in aggregate litigation for their claims for money damages.

Now, plaintiffs argue that this Court previously held that money relief was improbable, but that raises the question of why the settlement releases any monetary claims at all. If the release of aggregate litigation claims is valueless, as suggested, there is no reason to include it.

But smaller groups of class members or subclasses could litigate for money damages and the class could challenge the view that money damages are improbable. Class members shouldn't be giving up the right -- that right for no monetary relief in the settlement.

I also note that plaintiffs' don't that dispute those class members who are no longer working in the public interest sector or who have paid off their loans receive no benefit whatsoever from the injunctive relief.

Turning to cy-pres, plaintiffs make the confusing argument that class members would have to give up individual money damages claims in order for the 1.75 million in cy-pres

to be distributed through a claims process. But that makes no sense. I don't understand why class members would have to give up additional rights not negotiated at this settlement. If the parties were in fact to renegotiate a settlement with a broader release, then the settlement fund, of course, would be much greater to match the value of the claims being released.

Plaintiffs also question the fairness of a claims process itself, but that's a standard way that funds are distributed, particularly when class member addresses are not readily available. There is nothing unusual about a claims process. It is far more fair to give those class members who file a claim actual monetary relief they can use than to give all class members nothing, which is what this settlement does.

The parties already know who is a class member. They sent out direct notice to those individuals, so it is unclear why a claims process would require the kind of detailed documentation of each claimant's financial circumstances and the details of their oral communications as the plaintiffs claim.

Turning to the question of attorney's fees, we raised the problem of class counsel having what appears to be a fee-sharing arrangement with the American Federation of Teachers that was not disclosed to the Court or the class.

Plaintiffs don't deny that they never told the Court about the funding arrangement with AFT before moving for

preliminary approval or that the class was not notified. Disclosure was required and it would have allowed better monitoring of whether the class interests really were represented.

Class counsel's primary rebuttal appears to be semantic. They claim that the payment is reimbursement rather than a sharing agreement. But AFT is recovering \$500,000 of the fees they paid based on class counsel's work. That seems like the sharing of fees. Class counsel is recovering some portion and AFT is recovering some portion.

Class counsel has been very careful in how they word the AFT reimbursement. They still have not told us how much of their fees AFT actually paid. They have only told us how much their time is worth, how much they have billed, but I haven't seen any definitive statement about how much of that amount AFT actually paid. There needs to be transparency about how much of the fee prepayment the \$500,000 represents.

Plaintiffs are also wrong that there is no suggestion that class counsel's professional independence was compromised by this payment. There is a longstanding relationship here, and there appears to be some financial incentive to represent AFT's interest and to recover money on their behalf. And in fact AFT, as the Court knows, helped to find the main plaintiffs in this case.

On a final note, I note that in the response

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plaintiffs made some personal attacks against Mr. Yeatman and his counsel, including calling us "professional objectors" and questioning our motives. We view those attacks as entirely irrelevant to the fairness of the settlement and the fee request, and I don't plan to spend any time on them today. the Court is interested in this issue, however, we ask that the Court give us an opportunity to respond and look to the declaration of Theodore H. Frank, filed as Docket No. 164, which preemptively addresses some of those issues. Thank you very much for your time today, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. St. John. And that brings us to the last objector who will be heard today, Mr. Clauss. Mr. Clauss, are you on the line? (Pause) THE COURT: Mr. Clauss, I can't hear you. You might have to unmute yourself. (Pause) THE COURT: I'm still having difficulty hearing you, Mr. Clauss. (Pause) THE COURT: So I am -- Mr. Clauss, is that you? So I am sorry to report that I am unable to hear

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Mr. Clauss. Obviously if he joins us at some point during this

hearing before it concludes, I will be happy to hear anything

that he has to say.

But at this point let me turn to Ms. Konanova to respond to the objections heard today and to say anything else that she believes would be appropriate to be said in connection with this application.

Ms. Konanova.

MS. KONANOVA: Thank you, your Honor. Yelena Konanova for the plaintiffs and the class.

I would like to extend a welcome to all of the class representatives who are joining us today.

Your Honor, this settlement is a great deal for borrowers, and it provides unique relief that has never previously been available from Navient and which other class actions have been unable to obtain. Not only does the settlement preserve the class members' rights to sue Navient for individual damages, it materially enhances their ability to secure forgiveness.

I would like to spend a few minutes talking about the benefits of this settlement as responsive to the objections and then address some of the other points raised in the objections, with special attention to the notice of fees request issue that your Honor has raised.

Your Honor, as a result of this settlement, and it alone, a nonprofit called Public Service Promise has been incorporated with an initial board of three very impressive

directors and is prepared to launch with a singular focus of providing service for borrowers in public service to help them gain loan forgiveness. This is the first of its kind nonprofit to directly work with public service borrowers to help them access PSLF.

Navient has also implemented business practice enhancements which directly address the alleged harm. These enhancements require call center representatives to proactively ask questions to determine who may be eligible for forgiveness and to deliver accurate information about how to qualify. Navient is affirmatively required to train its representatives to comply and to monitor to ensure compliance.

Between the nonprofit and the required changes to Navient's protocol, borrowers now have a way to get essential, reliable individualized advice for the first time about how to obtain their relief from their student debt burden which helps maximize chances of forgiveness.

And as noted, the settlement preserves the right to bring individual actions for damages, which is directly responsive to this court's guidance that individual claims are the most viable avenue for monetary relief, given the challenges of proving uniformity of oral misrepresentations in the class context. And the affirmative provisions of this settlement make that economic relief avenue that much more viable.

Your Honor, this is an unprecedented result for this kind of class action. As this Court knows, in the related PSLF class action against Navient in Florida, the Court denied certification precisely because varying oral misrepresentations precluded a finding of commonality. Navient then prevailed on the individual claims on summary judgment, and the borrowers got nothing.

So taking note of this ruling and this Court's guidance, we fought as hard as we could to get the most value of the settlement here for the class while enhancing the viability of individual damages claimed.

Now, your Honor, in response to the objections we have received and the objections that have been raised today, the overwhelming majority of these objections share deeply personal stories of individuals' interactions with Navient and of their individual financial circumstances. And they ask for various kinds of monetary relief, such as loan forgiveness or credit for prior qualifying payments.

Your Honor, we take to heart the seriousness of these statements, the pain they describe. It is the reason we brought this case, and that is why we preserve individual damages claims and provide relief that enhances the success of these claims. We fought for all the relief we could in the class action context while insisting that these individual claims are preserved.

And now we always believed we had a strong case to reform business practices in the class context, and here that's exactly what these reforms are aimed at. They help borrowers advance their individual claims whether because they are now able to receive accurate information from Navient alerting them to any past inconsistencies or through the nonprofit which can walk people, all people, regardless of who their servicers are, whether they are still with Navient or not, it can walk them through their eligibility and specific steps for obtaining relief and, if necessary, to refer borrowers out for litigation of the individual claims.

Your Honor, the two professional objections that were also submitted, these objectors want to deprive the class of this very significant nonmonetary relief, to throw out the entire deal with no regard as to what would happen next. They have not pointed to anything warranting such a drastic result which would unquestionably leave borrowers worse off, likely with no relief of any kind.

Now, the objectors raised four specific buckets of objections, which I would like to address in order here.

So first, your Honor, they object to the lack of monetary relief for the class, which, as just discussed and as the Court reiterated at the beginning of the hearing, would be very challenging to achieve in this class context. Again, that is why we preserved individual damages claims and also why the

settlement will not impact the multiple state AG and financial watchdog cases pending against Navient.

Now, second, your Honor, they question the cy-près relief here. Now, for the reasons laid out, it is very significant because it is the first of its kind nonprofit directly serving public service borrowers in their quest for forgiveness. The nonprofit is independent both as a matter of contract and by virtue of the initial board which has three powerhouse individuals from the world of servicing settlements, public interest, and the law. The fact that the group cares about the same thing we do, which is communicating clear information to borrowers, is not a conflict. The nonprofit will provide exactly the kind of information that we know borrowers need, that we heard today borrowers need. They fill a hole in the chain of information that badly needs filling, and if the objectors had their way, the class would be deprived of that badly needed relief.

Now, that leaves objections concerning the service awards and the fee arrangement.

Your Honor, as to the service awards, recent Second Circuit precedent, including *Melito*, expressly permits service awards to class representatives based on the time and effort expended for the class and risks and burdens shouldered for the class. *Melito* expressly rejects the notion that Supreme Court precedent that — from the nineteenth century, that precedes

Rule 23 by decades, bars incentive awards. They have rejected this argument when it was made by Mr. Isaacson, raised there, and it should similarly be rejected here.

Our class representatives -- six of the ten of whom, by the way, still have loans with Navient, the others just have been transferred away to FedLoan since the litigation began, but six of ten of them still have loans with Navient -- they submitted an extensive record of their work for this class in their declaration, and that record focuses on two key points.

First, this action was based on oral misrepresentations. That means that without our class representative's records and recollections, their calendars and planners, we could not have written our complaint. By reconstructing what Navient said to them and when and how that affected their financial choices, each of them helped us understand the breadth, depth, and specifics of the problem.

And they helped us figure out how to address it, how to tailor the relief to help the borrowers most, including by making specific suggestions on the business practice enhancement and emphasizing the importance of the nonprofit to aid public service borrowers. They also gave broader releases than the class in order to secure the deal for the class. So, your Honor, some of the concerns raised by this Court in prior cases, such as, the risks that class interests took a back seat to the class representatives' interests simply do not apply

here. These class representatives fought to get the best deal possible for the class, at considerable cost to themselves.

Your Honor, that cost includes the fact that they have had to lay bare their finances, effectively publicly acknowledging they had trouble paying their debts, which is not an easy thing to do. They helped us share the story with the public, including through the press, which led to online harassment directed at them, some with overtly racist undertones and harassing treatment in their physical workplaces. This all the took a significant toll, mentally and physically, on these folks, your Honor. They have described it in their declarations as traumatizing and degrading. But without their perseverance we would never have gotten to the point of achieving this settlement. They did it for the class, and approving the awards here will spur other publicly minded individuals to make some more sacrifices.

Now, finally, your Honor, as to the fee arrangement and directly concerning the adequacy of notice regarding that fee request, Rule 23(h) sets the timing for fee requests at the time the Court orders so that the class members may have an opportunity to object. That's exactly what we did here. We made our fee award at the time ordered, which was August 28. Class members had two weeks to object.

Rule 23 otherwise does not require any funding -- any disclosure of any sort of funding arrangement. There is a

requirement of notice of fee sharing but, as I will discuss in a moment, we are not sharing our fees with AFT. We are only reimbursing in part for the fees that AFT paid.

Now, on that question of AFT's role in this litigation, AFT took on the obligation to fund this litigation, which meant paying S & G's bills as they come due on a monthly basis at discounted hourly rates. This uniquely successful and difficult lawsuit simply couldn't have been brought without them, and AFT agreed to do this because its mission is aligned with the class, supporting student borrowers and their request for loan forgiveness. And if you want public servants to continue in service fields in these difficult times of course that is more necessary than ever.

But, your Honor, let me be clear, AFT did not control this litigation. We worked hand in glove with the class representative on behalf of the class as we detailed above. And the 2015 Meredith case, which we cite in our papers, is exactly on point, as in that case Judge Engelmayer approved a fee award to reimburse a nonprofit who paid class counsel fees. If there were any concerns that — with that kind of arrangement, your Honor, we believe Judge Engelmayer would have raised it, but there is none. Any holding, we believe, that discourages such arrangements could only mean that important and complex cases like this one would not be brought.

And, your Honor, as to the requests of further

information about this arrangement or communications with AFT, we are aware of no case in which such discovery was allowed based on speculation of conflict. Instead, courts say you need to have some actual evidence of collusion, of a collusive settlement, in order to allow that kind of discovery, and we do not have that here.

So this extraordinarily modest fee award, which works out to 8.45 percent of the fees here and the service awards and the settlement itself should be approved.

I'm glad to answer any questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Konanova, I think in the comments made by objectors today, there were two additional points that you should address.

One is that the -- I just received a note that Mr. Clauss is back on the line, so I will give him an opportunity to be heard in a moment. I'm not sure that he is accessible, but I will certainly inquire again and give him an opportunity to be heard if he is on the line.

MR. CLAUSS: Yes, your Honor, this is Mr. Clauss. I'm here.

THE COURT: Okay, good. Well, Mr. Clauss, when Ms. Konanova is done speaking, I will give you an opportunity to be heard.

So Ms. Konanova, two points made today orally, and that is that the bar to the settlement agreement that would be

binding on the class is not just a bar against class actions, but it is a bar against actions in which -- joinder actions in which five or more plaintiffs are joined together. That's one issue I would like you to address.

And the second point is that the awards achieved through the -- or I should say the improvements, including the cy-près award, achieved through the settlement help people who continue to have debts to be paid down or loans to be forgiven, but it benefits prospectively and it doesn't benefit those who have already finished paying off their loans and who no longer have an opportunity to obtain forgiveness.

So if you could address those two issues, Ms. Konanova.

MS. KONANOVA: Thank you, your Honor. I am glad to do so.

On the first issue, it is correct that the release prohibits class actions as well as aggregate actions, which release language was defined — designed to ensure that the benefit of the bargain that Navient was entering into in the settlement was actually reached. Your Honor, we negotiated very specifically to exclude from the definition of "aggregate actions" any litigation proceedings in which an external authority or a Court requires particular actions to be prosecuted together, which includes, but is not limited to, multidistrict litigation as determined by the JPML actions in

which a Court determines they should be consolidated or coordinated for efficiency, actions that individuals mark as potentially related and are deemed related by the Court, or any actions that are required to be brought together based on the federal rules of civil procedure or the local rules of any local, state, or federal court.

So, your Honor, we believe this definition both preserves the benefit of the bargain, which is to say the release of class and aggregate damages for Navient, but also allows borrowers who believe that there is a reason for particular actions to be prosecuted together, as captured by the categories that I just discussed, to do so without a bar under the settlement agreement.

On the second point, your Honor, with respect to how does this settlement benefits individuals who do not have loans any longer, your Honor, those individuals all benefited by the formation of the nonprofit, the Public Service Promise. That nonprofit is open to all borrowers, regardless of who their servicer is or even whether they have individual loans. They will be able to contact that nonprofit and get individualized, reliable, accurate information about their personal situations. And if, as a result of that conversation, it appears that that person has an individual damages claim against Navient, Public Service Promise will refer that individual out to an attorney who would be able to handle such an individual claim. So even

those who no longer have loans, and so they only have questions as to whether they have been damaged by Navient, will still be able to rely on this resource of informed, independent advisors who can talk to them about their individual financial circumstances.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Konanova.

Mr. Clauss --

MR. CLAUSS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- are you able to speak with me now?

MR. CLAUSS: Yes, I am. Thank you, your Honor. Do you want me to give my objection now?

THE COURT: Please.

MR. CLAUSS: Okay. I object to the proposed settlement.

If Navient agrees to implement substantial procedures, then they should be comprehensive and transparent in the following ways:

Address the irony of past failures that financially disable borrowers who've work for qualified nonprofits. In order for me to be bound by this class action's injunctive relief, retroactive processing of payments would be mandatory.

E-mail communications should outline Navient's procedures prior to approval to ensure transparency regarding their specific and substantial plan for action.

Mitigate consolidation anxiety. Navient should

protect borrowers from adverse reconsolidation tactics.

Reconsolidation should benefit public service employees and credit their work through past ecosystems, not bluntly refuse to address past systemic bureaucratic failures.

Integrate all student loans within the database into a singular platform that accommodates public service employees.

And, finally, negate compound interest that accrued on principal over time while qualified applications were steered away.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your concise but carefully thought out comments, Mr. Clauss. I appreciate that.

MR. CLAUSS: You're welcome.

THE COURT: Let me just say that -- yes, thank you.

I really appreciate the engagement of the class members in this very important moment in this litigation.

Obviously this class contains a very well-educated population who are able to think with care about what has happened here and what should happen in the future, and your comments have been important for me in my evaluation of the reasonableness of this settlement.

So let me turn now to my task, and there are really, as I outlined before, three separate issues:

First, for me to judge, under the legal standards I

must follow, which are set forth in a case named *Grinnell*, whether or not the settlement should be approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable in the circumstances as judged by the factors set forth in the *Grinnell* case.

And the first factor I have to look at, in judging a settlement, is the factor that is directed to the complexity, expense, and likely duration of this litigation. I find, and I don't think there is much dispute here, that this is complex litigation. It's been expensive to pursue to date and would be far more expensive if it had continued to the end. I believe that if the litigation had continued that it would have ended as a class action through the litigation of a class certification motion, that the application by plaintiffs' counsel to certify as a class this lawsuit would have been denied.

That would have left the claims of the New York named plaintiffs, and I very much doubt that I would have been able to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment, and therefore I think those claims would, in all likelihood, have proceeded to trial.

So this is a complex litigation, with massive discovery ahead, with complex motion practice ahead, and probably a trial for some named plaintiff.

The second factor I must look at in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement is the reaction of the class to

this settlement. I must say that the reaction of the class has been mixed. This is a very large class, and I think there were only 115 objections filed that were timely. There were four more objections, I believe, that were filed late, making a total of 119 objections.

But that really is a large number of objections, even though the class is so large. Most class actions don't have the involvement of class members the way this one has, and I think my ability to make judgments about the reasonableness of this settlement has been enhanced by the comments received from the objectors, and so I thank them for those comments.

Most of the objections have raised concern about the lack of an award of damages. They complain that the individual class members are not receiving any monetary compensation here, and they complain, at least some of them, bitterly about that based on their individual circumstances, and that is absolutely understandable.

But, again, I don't believe, and I think really there is no sound argument to suggest, that there could be a class action that would result in a monetary award to individual class members because the circumstances for each individual member differ so dramatically; and therefore, the only recourse, the only avenue for obtaining a monetary award for an individual class member is to pursue your own individual action or, as I understand it, you may be benefited by lawsuits

brought by government entities. I certainly hope, if that is an appropriate avenue in those litigations, that that benefits one and all.

The third issue I must address is the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed when settlement was reached. The parties had exchanged some discovery materials, but this was at the early stage of discovery. Much more discovery remained to be done.

The fourth factor is the risk of establishing liability. I think that it is very difficult for me to evaluate the likelihood that the New York named plaintiffs would have been successful at trial. I'm just not in a position to evaluate that.

The fifth factor is the risk of establishing damages. Well, as I have already mentioned, there was a grave risk that the class would not receive any damages award because it could not be certified as a class action and, as I have already explained, it is unknown to me whether the New York plaintiffs would have been able to recover anything.

The sixth factor is the risk of maintaining the class action through trial. I have already said there is a grave risk that it would not have been maintained through the trial.

The seventh factor is the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment. Navient is able to pay a judgment far larger than that it has agreed to here.

The eighth factor is the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery, and I find that this settlement is absolutely within the range of reasonable settlements, given the weighing of all of the factors I have just discussed.

And the last factor is the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all of the attendant risks of litigation and, again, I find that this settlement is within the range of reasonable settlements because there is a grave risk that there would have been no recovery at all, certainly none for the class, and possibly none for the named New York plaintiffs.

This is a (b)(2), using the jargon from the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under which we are operating here, and there are certain issues about when it is or isn't appropriate to approve a settlement for a class action when there is no opt-out provision. I think that is adequately dealt with by the fact that individual class members retain their right to bring individual lawsuits. And to the extent that there has been reference to the Second Circuit decision in Berni, I think those concerns are adequately addressed in the parties' letters of July 20 that I have already referred to.

So let me turn to the incentive awards.

As the parties are well aware, since I have discussed this with them on several prior occasions, I am reluctant to

award named plaintiffs money for anything other than the reimbursement of their out-of-pocket loss or lost wages. And I have set forth the reasons for that in a decision that is publicly filed in the *Credit Default Swaps Litigation*, and that can be found at 2016 WL 2731524 at *18.

There are grave risks with financial awards given to named plaintiffs that it will encourage collusion. Named plaintiffs have a fiduciary duty to class members, absent class members, and I believe the Court has to be on alert to protect the rights of absent class members, but certainly named plaintiffs must. And you do not want that important fiduciary duty to -- and counsel alluded to this -- take a back seat to their personal financial interests.

So the question is, for me, here, has that happened?

Here the named plaintiffs have very limited out-of-pocket

losses or identified lost wages, and yet each asks to receive

\$15,000. They are giving up the right to sue Navient

individually, so this is all the money that they will receive.

The class, however, individual class members who are absent and

not named plaintiffs, are going to receive no money, and this

has understandably drawn objections from several members of the

class.

But I think there is a reduced concern here of collusion. As I have explained, the individualized issues regarding any misrepresentations or omissions by Navient would

have prevented class certification, and therefore there is no damages that could have been awarded to absent class members. And since those absent class members would not have received any money, there is little risk that the class representatives breached their duty in agreeing to this settlement. So that's one of my important findings as I assess this issue.

Now, it is hard, indeed it is impossible, for me to evaluate the value of what absent class members have retained, that is, the right to bring suit for individual damages. And it is also impossible for me to evaluate the value of what the class representatives have given up in exchange for this \$15,000. These are, in both situations, complex inquiries. They depend on the individual's financial circumstances. They depend on the piecing together of conversations with Navient. Ultimately, assessments would have to be made as to whether Navient made misrepresentations or omitted in a way that is wrongful to add information in response to questions or to add information to statements that they did make. And of course, in addition to all of that, whether it is also difficult for me to know, impossible for me to know whether any of that could be proven at trial successfully.

The next thing that's important to me in evaluating this request is the following, and I would like you,

Ms. Konanova, to listen carefully to what I am about to say, so if I have misrepresented or misunderstood anything, I would

like to you correct me.

First, it is my understanding that the class representatives opened their lives to scrutiny when they stepped forward, and without that commitment on their part, this litigation could not have been brought. Therefore, they laid bare their financial circumstances, their career choices, and their personal histories to a large extent. Each is a public service or was a public service employee who held at one time or another significant debts that they needed to pay off.

Am I right, Ms. Konanova?

MS. KONANOVA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And each arguably, if properly advised, would have had significant opportunity to have debts forgiven.

Is that right, Ms. Konanova?

MS. KONANOVA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And am I right also that an award of \$15,000 a piece here will compensate them for only a fraction of the debt that they held at some point in time, if not currently?

MS. KONANOVA: Yes, your Honor. The debts of the named plaintiffs range from tens of thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

THE COURT: And of course in the papers that have been submitted to me there is the evidence that they have suffered attack personally because they have served in their role here

as named plaintiff and tried to achieve a benefit on behalf of absent class members. Some of them have been subjected to vitriol which, sadly, is part of public discourse these days but should not be part of the burden of serving as a plaintiff in a class action.

Weighing all of those factors, it is my assessment that the incentive awards for the named plaintiffs should be given in the amount requested.

Therefore, let me turn to the last aspect of this request, and that is the request for attorney's fees.

Let me start by giving some context as I understand it.

Counsel for the class reduced their rates by 20 percent and the American Federation of Teachers has paid counsel's bills, as we learned today, monthly based on those reduced rates. As plaintiffs' counsel describe in their papers, they spent over 11,000 hours on this litigation, and the attorney's fees have been close to \$6 million -- \$5,915,000 roughly -- and today is the day I learned that that sum had been paid in its entirety.

I am and remain concerned about notice issues here.

As counsel know I typically, and certainly in this case as well, take the step of a preliminary approval of a class action seriously and spend time looking at the settlement agreement, the papers supplied asking for preliminary approval, as well as

the notice that will go out to the class, and I make suggestions for revision to that class notice, and I did so here. This was no exception.

The settlement agreement provided me with no notice that counsel's fees were being paid on an ongoing basis or that there would be a request to reimburse AFT for those payments. The preliminary approval papers that counsel submitted to me gave me no notice of those facts. Now, AFT is mentioned in the settlement agreement in two places, but not in connection with the fee request here in any way that would put me on notice that it was a request to reimburse AFT.

And because I didn't have that knowledge and counsel did not advise me of those facts, the notices to the class also did not alert the class to those facts. Indeed, what they included were statements that I think now, based on my current understanding, are misleading. For instance, the notice — one notice said that the request would be made for up to \$500,000 to plaintiffs' lawyers for their attorney's fees. Another notice, the short-form notice, said "these attorneys will request that a Court award fees and expenses up to \$500,000." There was no statement that the attorney's fees have been paid on a monthly basis and that this would be a request to reimburse the AFT for those payments.

In the papers submitted to me requesting payment of the attorney's fees, I did not understand, even at that time,

that AFT had fully paid the attorney's fees accumulated to date and that the \$500,000 would be going to AFT. The situation was described as AFT having made a significant up-front payment, and the supporting documentation didn't indicate to me that AFT had paid all the bills submitted by counsel.

So I am left with concern here about notice to the Court and the class, and so I am not going to address the merits of the application of the request for approval to use 500,000 of the settlement fund to reimburse AFT.

Now, that said, I want to make a couple of points:

The impact of this, as I understand it, will mean that Public Service Promise will be even more significantly funded, since that \$500,000 will now be part of the *cy-près* fund for Public Service Promise.

The second point I would like to make, my decision to not award this sum to AFT is not a criticism of AFT and should not be heard as such. They spent about \$6 million on this litigation to help all public service employees get loan forgiveness to the extent that the law permits and damages for any role Navient played in interfering with that important right. In my judgment, because of AFT's work and its decision and its generosity, the class has achieved a significant benefit, and that significant benefit will have or may have a profound impact on all public service employees.

By funding Public Service Promise, we have an

independent, well-qualified board overseeing the work of its employees in the education and training and outreach that will help public service employees be better informed and better able to take advantage of all their rights. And of course Navient itself has benefited because of the work the AFT has done here to improve its own practices and be a better corporate citizen. So I think that the motive behind AFT acting as it has and the commitment it has shown in this litigation and funding fully this litigation is nothing but admirable.

So those are my closing comments, but I want to make sure counsel have an opportunity to add anything to the record they believe is important at this point.

Ms. Konanova?

MS. KONANOVA: Your Honor, thank you for those remarks.

The only thing I might add is our efforts in submitting the papers were to comply with Rule 23 and, in particular, Rule 23(h), which requires information concerning the fee award to be made at the time the Court ordered, so that is the rule with which we were complying in our papers. And at the same time I understand your Honor's comments about the adequacy of notice, and I appreciate your remarks.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And Ms. Simonsen, anything you want to add?

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1	(Pause)
2	THE COURT: Counsel for the defendants?
3	MR. RUFFINO: Your Honor, this is Mr. Ruffino. I
4	understand that Ms. Simonsen may be having problems with her
5	connection, but we have nothing to add, and we thank the Court
6	for its consideration.
7	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
8	Ms. Konanova, can I ask you to submit a revised
9	judgment next week?
10	MS. KONANOVA: Absolutely, your Honor. Will do.
11	THE COURT: And how about Wednesday next week?
12	MS. KONANOVA: Glad to do so.
13	THE COURT: Thank you so much, and thank you all who
14	have participated in this hearing either through speaking or
15	listening in. It is greatly appreciated. Thank you.
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